| |
|
Photos by Dan Vaught, 3/20 FA
|
3d ARMORED DIVISION ARTILLERY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Operation Desert Storm, Phases III - V (24-28 February 1991)
INDEX
("G-Day" = Start of Ground War)
From Department of the Army
- Declassified
Parent Organization = ARCENT; Unit = VII Corps
Folder Title = VII Corps Arty - Book 3 - Commander Rept -
Tab I - 3AD Arty Hist Summ Phases II-VI, Vol 17C
Return to Index
G-DAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1991
The friendly situation at the beginning of Phase III was as
follows: The mission of the VII Corps was "to attack, on
order, the Iraqi defenses and destroy the Republican Guards Forces
Command (RGFC) in zone". The RBFC was composed primarily
of the AL Medina and Hamurabi Armored Divisions and the Tawakalna
Mechanized Division. However, there were numerous other forces,
including the 12th, 17th and 52d Armored Divisions in close proximity
and probably under control of the RBFC. Phase V (Destruction
of the RGFC) plans were outlined in VII Corps FRAGPLAN 7. It
stated that the 3d Armored Division (3AD) mission was to "conduct
an envelopment in accordance with OPORD 1990-2, and on order,
attack in coordination with the 1st Armored Division (1AD) to
destroy RGFC in the vicinity of Objective Dorsett. The VII Corps
was oriented to the North with the XVIII Airborne Corps (ABC)
on its left flank and Northern Arab Command (NAC) on the right
flank. The VII Corps itself was on line with the 1AD, the 3AD,
the 1st Infantry Division (1ID), and the 1st Cavalry Division
(1CD) from west to east. The 1CD was technically the ARCENT reserve.
The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) occupied positions in
Forward Assembly Area (FAA) Concord, directly north of FAA Garcia
and FAA Butts, which were occupied by the 1AD and the 3AD respectively.
The 1st United Kingdom Armored Division, 1(UK)AD, was in their
FAA positioned to the south of 1ID. The 1ID plan was to open
a breach site and for the 1(UK)AD to pass through. The 1(UK)AD
then planned to move north and then turn east into the enemy
flank. VII Corps alone was to attack on the day after Ground
Day (G Day) at BMNT. All other forces would attack on G Day.
The intelligence assessment from the G-2, 3AD as of 240300
was as follows: Iraq will continue to maintain its defense in
the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). Iraqi ground forces are
incapable of conducting an operational level offensive, although
the RGFC remains capable of conducting limited counterattacks.
Units will remain dispersed to enhance survivability against
Coalition air attacks and to conserve forces for the anticipated
ground attack. There are no major indications that Iraq has repositioned
any of its heavy forces just prior to the start of the ground
campaign. Iraq will probably wait until it has identified the
Coalition's main attack before repositioning its limited armored
and mechanized forces.
On 24 Feb at 0530, the 3AD Divarty Headquarters (HQ) was positioned
in FAA Butts at grid NS 308854. The Divarty conducted Stand-to
in preparation for movement from the current location to positions
several kilometers north into FAA Concord. The Divarty HQ was
directed to SP at 1200 hours. This movement was planned to close
the gap between the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Corps screen,
and the lead elements of the 3d Armored Division. This movement
would facilitate preparation for the VII Corps ground attack
on G+1.
Combat action along the ARCENT front started at 0400 on the
24th of February. At 0140 hours, the Division TAC passed a new
VII Corps Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) with an effective
date time group (DTG) of 240300. The new FSCL was from grid NT
242600 to grid PT 775600. At 0424 hours, the DTAC passed information
to the Divarty which confirmed that the 6th French Light Armor
Division attacked at 0400 hours.
At 1000 hrs, the Divarty HQ received a warning order from
Division: "Be prepared to attack 1100 hours." Slightly
more than an hour ahead of its planned movement, at 1054 hours
on the 24th of February, the Divarty HQ departed from Forward
Assembly Area BUTTS. Rather than stopping and occupying positions
in FAA CONCORD as planned, the Division was ordered to attack
north through FAA BUTTS and cross the Line of Departure (LD)
in order to exploit the successes in the MARCENT sector. Meanwhile,
the 3AD 2d Brigade and 4-82 FA rolled at 1000 hours, conducted
a refuel south of the LD and increased their Mission Oriented
Protective Posture (MOPP) level. 2-3 FA began movement from FAA
Butts with the 3AD 1st Brigade at 1120 hours. At approximately
1300, the Divarty HQ stopped short of the LD to assume an increase
in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP). The Divarty went
to MOPP level 2 and took Pyridostigmine Bromide (Nerve Agent
Pre-treatment Tablets) in anticipation of possible Iraqi chemical
weapons use. While waiting to cross the LD, the Divarty dispatched
a liaison party to conduct link-up operations with the 1-27FA
(MLRS), "Gridsmashers", a battalion from the 42d Field
Artillery Brigade.
At 1448 hours, C Battery, 4-82 FA crossed the berm followed
by A Battery at 1450 hours. A/40 FA crossed the border behind
4-8 CAV at 1455 hours. The 4-82 FA HHB and their TOC crossed
at lane number 26 (grid NT 342241) at 1525 hours. B Battery crossed
at 1525 hours, and the Dragons had entered Iraq. At approximately
1600, the Divarty Tactical Operations Center (TOC) rolled forward
and crossed into Iraq proceeding through the obstacle belt known
as the Berm. The Divarty passed through berm lane number 27 at
grid NT 35002299 and continued movement Northeast as part of
the Division movement to contact. 2-3 FA crossed the berm at
1642 hours. By 1800 hours 4-82 FA had proceeded 25 kilometers
into Iraqi territory.
The Division moved in a column of Brigades. The 4-7 Cavalry
screened the Division right flank under the control of the Combat
Aviation Brigade (CAB). The column of Brigades from north to
south were 2d Brigade, 1st Brigade, and 3rd Brigade. The Divarty
TOC moved behind the 2d Brigade trains. The Direct Support (DS)
artillery battalions moved in formation with their supported
brigades. Each DS battalion was provided a Q-36 Mortar Locating
Radar from the division Target Acquisition (TA) Battery, F/333
"Finder", to facilitate counterfire operations. A/40
FA "Deepstrike", the division artillery MLRS battery,
had a General Support Reinforcing (GSR) mission to 4-82 FA. They
traveled behind the 4-8 Cav, the lead battalion of 2d Bde in
order to facilitate long range fires in support of the Division.
Additionally, 4-82 FA was provided with a Q-37 Artillery Locating
Radar and a Meteorological section to facilitate firing operations.
The remaining Q-37 radar from the F/333 Target Acquisition (TA)
Battery traveled with and under the control of the HHB Divarty,
as did the second Divarty Meteorological section. HHB Divarty
had the 2d Platoon, C Battery, 5-3 Air Defense Artillery Battalion
(Platoon Leader, LT Brandt), a Chapparal platoon with four weapon
systems, attached to provide air defense coverage throughout
the operation. The battery also had a signal SEN team (SSG Lopez,
NCOIC) attached from the 143d Signal Battalion to provide Mobile
Subscriber Equipment (MSE) support to the [Web Editor's Note:
the text for this paragraph ends prematurely at this point; obviously
a typing omission of probably short length].
Link up with the 1-27 FA was accomplished at grid NT 480380
with the commander and S-3 of 1-27 FA, LTC Vallario and MAJ Jensen.
At approximately 1700 hours, the Gridsmashers entered the 3d
Armored Division zone. They had just completed firing in the
preparation which supported the 1ID advance and breach operations
in the east.
The Divarty was passed a new Fire Support Coordination Line
at 1748 hours with an effective DTS of 1645 hours. FSCL grids
were from NU 7520, to PU 1820 to PT 5290 to PT 5250 to PT 8050.
At approximately 1900 hours, the Divarty occupied the first night
position at grid NT 438334 and continued 24-hour tactical operations.
At approximately 1930 hours, the Gridsmashers occupied night
firing positions at grid NT 456334, approximately 2 kilometers
east of the Divarty. Face to face contact was later established
at the Divarty Tactical Operations Center. The 1-27 FA assumed
a General Support mission upon entering the Division zone.
At 1950 hours the Divarty received the following Intelligence
SITREP: "No reports of chemical use in theater. Resistance
to the 2ACR light throughout. 2ACR captured 210 EPW (Enemy Prisoners
of War). MARCENT 5000 EPW. Assessment: Enemy will continue to
defend in place. No major activity in the 3AD sector. Do not
expect any significant activity tonight."
By 2130 hours all units had closed in position. Unit locations
were: A/40 FA - NT 510447; 2-3 FA - NT 419335; 2-82 FA - NT 351231,
and 4-82 - NT496431. Only 2-82 FA supporting the 3d Brigade remained
in Saudi Arabia at the end of the day. All other Divarty units
were established in Iraq. The DTAC and DMAIN closed at NT 482420
and NT 292194 respectively. The 42d FAB was still located in
the 1ID zone at NT 622257. Their mission to reinforce 1ID Division
Artillery had not changed.
At 2135 the Division Artillery units reported weapons status
as follows: A/40 (MLRS)-10 of 10 systems operational, 2-3 FA
had 25 of 25 howitzers operational, 2-82 FA had 22 of 26 howitzers
operational, and 4-82 FA had 22 of 25 howitzers operational.
The Divarty had a total of 69 of 75 M109A2 howitzer systems operational,
and all of its 10 MLRS systems operational.
The Divarty covered a cross-country distance of 37 miles on
G-Day, of which 34 were within the country of Iraq.
Task Organization, G-Day, 24 Feb 91
3d Armored Division Artillery
2-3 FA "Gunners", 155mm SP, DS, 1st BDE
2-82 FA, "Red Dragons", 155mm SP, DS, 3d BDE
4-82 FA, "Dragons", 155mm SP, DS, 2d BDE
A/40 FA, "Deepstrike", MLRS, GSR 4-82 FA
F/333 FA, "Finder", TA, GS
1/27 FA, "Gridsmasher", MLRS, GS (Effective upon link
up)
The 3d Armored Division Artillery, the Force Field Artillery
Headquarters, was not called upon, and did not fire any missions
on the first day of the conflict.
Return to Index
G+1, 25 FEBRUARY 1991
The 2-3 FA Gunners conducted stand to at 0430 hours on the
25th of February. In the 2d Brigade zone movement started at
0551 hours. At 0641 hours, the Divarty started movement as the
Division continued the movement to contact. MOPP level II was
still in effect. The 2-3 FA was moving at 0830 hours. The Division
proceeded with its plan to move into a wedge formation in the
vicinity of PL Melon. The 4-7 CAV/CAS screened the Division right
flank along the division boundary with 1ID. The 2d Brigade was
in the lead in the center of the Division zone, while the 3d
and 1st Brigades followed behind on the left and right flanks.
The Divarty HO continued to move directly behind 2d Brigade,
and between 1st and 3d Brigades. The 1-27 FA moved with C Battery
in the western half of the Division zone behind the 4-18 IN and
the other two batteries moved in the eastern half of the zone.
The direct support battalions continued moving with their supported
brigades, and 4-82 FA maintained control of the Q-37 radar and
a metro section.
At approximately 1000 hours, the Divarty S-3 dispatched a
liaison party to link-up with the 4-7 CAV (Saber) at a contact
point on the 3AD and 1ID boundary. The 4-7 CAV was to secure
the area through which the 42d FAB "Wheelhorse" would
enter the 3AD zone. Meanwhile, 4-82 FA with the Division's lead
brigade stopped temporarily for refuel operations. At approximately
1100 hours the Divarty liaison party established contact with
Saber 6, LTC Tucker, the commander of 4-7 CAV at the designated
contact point (grid NT 770565). At 1105 hours, 2-3 FA was ordered
to be prepared to receive 2-29 FA. At 1241 hours the liaison
party made contact was made with COL Morris J. Boyd, the commander
42d FAB, and LTC Faircloth and LTC Stratman of the 3-20 FA (Diamond
Back) and 2-29 FA (Pathfinders) Battalions respectively. The
42d FAB was composed of their HHB and the two 155mm self propelled
(SP) Artillery Battalions. The plan was to move the 42d FAB to
signal node center 60 at grid NT 490510 to rearm, refuel, and
receive medical attention if necessary. Node center 60 was south
of Phase Line Melon, but the Division had already passed PL Melon
and was rapidly moving towards Phase Line Vegas. Given the circumstances,
the Divarty Commander, COL John F. Michitsch, directed that the
42d FAB link up with the Division as soon as possible. The Commander
of the 42d FAB, COL Boyd, reported no serious shortfalls in Class
III or V. No additional logistical support was deemed necessary.
Therefore, the 42d FAB was directed to expeditiously move northward
to join and reinforce the Division. The liaison officer notified
the Division TAC of the link-up plan to move 2-29 FA into zone
first behind the 1st Brigade and then to bring the 42d FAB HHB
and 3-20 FA to a point along the 3d Brigade and 1st Brigade boundaries,
and to then follow that boundary Northeast to link up with Divarty
and the 2d Brigade. The "Wheelhorse" Brigade responded
accordingly, and immediately began to move. The 2-29 FA "Path-Finders"
were the first to move into the 3AD zone as the 1st Brigade passed.
The reinforced unit, 2-3 FA, sent LT Soley, their Recon Survey
Officer, to meet 2-29 FA and facilitate the transition. Next,
the Wheelhorse Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) along
with the 3-20 FA moved west toward the center of the division
zone, then turned north traveling parallel with the Division
Support Command convoys. This movement was designed to effect
a link up with the HHB Divarty, which was still an the Move,
in an expeditious and orderly manner. The 3-20 FA mission was
to conduct link up operations with 4-82 FA, which was in the
front and center of the Division zone, and assume a reinforcing
mission.
By 1400 hours, the Pathfinders had caught up with 2-3 FA.
At approximately 1700 hours the Divarty occupied a new position
at PT 037936. At approximately 1745 hours, the 42d FAB occupied
a position slightly southwest of the Divarty at grid PT 031931.
About dusk, the 3-20 FA entered the 2d Brigade zone and began
occupying positions to reinforce 4-82 FA. At approximately 183O
hours, 2-3 FA occupied positions in the vicinity of grid PT 110960,
and 2-29 FA occupied in the vicinity at PT 990940. Finally after
their long road march up the Division zone, 3-20 FA closed with
4-82 FA at 2040 hours and commenced preparing to reinforce the
fires of 4-82 FA. The "Wheelhorse" FAB had closed with
the Division Artillery.
At 2145 hours, a new FSCL was received with an effective DTG
of 251500 hours (From grids PU 6461 to PU 6961 to PT 6950 to
PT 8050).
At the end of the day, the Division was closed on Phase Line
Berlin. The 2d Brigade was still centered in the middle of the
zone. The 1st Brigade was slightly behind in the south, and the
3d Brigade was to the rear but had not yet closed completely
into the Division wedge. The 2d ACR was still screening forward
of the Division along Phase Line Smash.
The Divarty received an INTSUM as of 252130L Feb 91: (1) Iraqi
52 AD repositioned as blocking force for Tawakalna Division.
Two Iraqi Bde sized elements between VIC PV 3904 to PT 5193.
The Third Bde from the 52 AD is now located VIC PV 7537. (2)
The 50 AR Bde and the 37 AR Bde of the 12 AD have moved into
a blocking position, tied in with the 52 AD. Locations unknown
at this time. (3) Locations of the Tawakalna Mech Division, which
has repositioned are as follows: 9 AR Bdo PT 6496, A Mech Bde
PU 7605, B Mech Bde PU 7213. (4) No identification of movement
of the Al Medina, the Hamurabi, or the 17 AD. (5) MARCENT reports
capture of 10,000 EPWs to date. Marine forces advanced to south
of Kuwait City. Currently attacking to seize airfield south of
Kuwait City. (6) 2 ACR reports contact with Mech task force at
PL Smash, VIC PU 2004. Destroyed 24 BTR-60s. (7) Report of minefield
with berm VIC NT 828857 and additional minefield VIC 2941N 4549E.
Report of trenches VIC NT 798849. (8) 3d Bde, 3AD reported capture
of 100 EPWS, 251900L, location unknown.
As of 2300 hours Divarty and 42d FAB units reported the following
weapons status. Based on number on hand and number mission capable:
2-82 FA had 26 on hand and 23 mission capable; 2-3 FA had 25
on hand and 22 mission capable; 4-82 FA had 25 on hand and 16
mission capable. A/40 had 10 MLRS on hand and 9 operational.
The 42d FAB units reported as follows: 1-27 FA had 23 of its
26 launchers operational. 3-20 and 2-29 FA reported 23 of 26,
and 22 of 25 howitzers operational respectively.
The Divarty covered a distance of 53 miles on the second day
of the conflict.
Task Organization, G-Day +1, 25 Feb 91
3d Armored Division Artillery
2-3 FA "Gunners", 155mm SP, DS, 1st BDE
2-82 FA, "Red Dragons", 155mm SP, DS, 3d BDE
4-82 FA, "Dragons", 155mm SP, DS, 2d BDE
A/40 FA, "Deepstrike", MLRS, GSR 4-82
F/337 FA, "Finder", TA, GS
42 Field Artillery Brigade, R 3ADA
2-29 FA, "Path-Finders", 155mm SP, R 2-3FA
3-20 FA, "Diamond Back", 155mm SP, R 4-82 FA
1/27 FA, "Gridsmasher", MLRS, SS
Neither the 3d Armored Division Artillery, the Force Field
Artillery Headquarters nor the 42d Field Artillery Brigade were
called upon, and did not fire any missions in the Division zone
on the second day of the conflict.
Return to Index
G+2, 26 FEBRUARY 1991
At 0040 hours on the 26th of February, 3-20 FA reported that
they had completed refuel operations.
At 0315 hours Divarty received a new FSCL and BCL with effective
DTG of 260400 hours local. The FSCL plotted from grids PU9050
to PT 9067 and the BCL plotted from grid PT 6380 to PT 7074 to
PT 5549.
Divarty received a Corps SITREP at 0325 hours: 1AD continues
attack vicinity Objective Purple, will continue through Objective
Collins to Objective Bonn. 1ID will attack 0430 hours along the
southern flank of 3AD to Objective Norfolk.
Preparation for movement in the Division zone started early.
At 0500 hours the Divarty Jump TOC became operational, and the
main TOC prepared to march order. The 42d FAB moved at 0655 hours.
At 0700 hours, the 2-3 FA repositioned their Q-36 radar with
2-29 FA. And at 0730 hours, 4-82 FA and the 2d Brigade continued
forward to lead the Division attack.
At 0800 the Division passed new graphics on the Division Command
net. The Divarty monitored the new coordinates for boundaries,
objectives, and phase lines and posted them accordingly. North
boundary grids PU 400280 to PU 590290 to PU 390245 to QU 250100.
South boundary grids PU 400070 to PU 430090 to PU 580080 to PU
770070 to PU 880040 to QU 140915. The objectives were as follows:
3AD Objective Dorsett; grid PU 9615, and 3AD Objective Minden,
grid QU 130000. Phase Line Tangerine grids PU 590290 to PU 580080,
PL Malta PU 4002BO to 400070, PL Bullet PU 750270 to PU 750075,
PL Lime PU 905250 to PU 770070, and PL Kiwi QU 260100 to PU 140910.
These graphics represented the zone in which the 3d Armored Division
would execute VII Corps FRAS Plan 7 which called for the destruction
of the RGFC.
HHB, Divarty moved at 0839 hours. The Division continued the
movement to contact. The Division intermediate objective was
to reach Phase Line Tangerine. While enroute to PL Tangerine,
in the vicinity of PL Malta, the 2d ACR moved to the southeast
out of the Division zone and in front of the 1ID to the east.
The 2d ACR then continued eastward to fix enemy forces at Objective
Norfolk. The CG, 3AD directed all MLRS to stay well forward and
occupy firing positions along the 57 North/South grid line. Once
the Division closed on Phase Line Tangerine, the 1st Brigade
moved forward and came on line with the 2d Brigade. 4-82 FA refueled
at PL Tangerine at approximately 1430 hours and then occupied
firing positions along with 3-20 FA. The Division then continued
the attack east towards PL Bullet with two brigades abreast,
and the 3d Brigade following. The Division was later ordered
to continue the attack to PL Lime. At this point the CG, 3AD
wanted to exploit the situation, and directed the units to move.
The Division encountered enemy contact in the vicinity of
Phase Line Bullet. In the 2d Brigade zone, at 1600 hours, the
4-8 CAV made first contact with a forward screen or observation
post composed of infantry troops in bunkers, a BRDM and ZSU 23-4.
This complex was located forward (2km) of a thin line of tanks
and mechanized infantry. 4-82 FA occupied firing positions at
1615 hours. Simultaneously, 4-8 CAV destroyed the tracked vehicles,
and continued movement forward. 4-82 FA flew a MET, transmitted
the data to the battalion FDC, and was prepared for firing at
1630 hours. The Division Artillery HQ conducted a hasty occupation
at grid PU 608172, oriented radars, and also flew a MET. The
2d Brigade continued killing targets for the next 20 minutes.
The 2d Brigade and 4-82 FA moved forward. A few minutes later,
3-20 FA also displaced and moved. At 1646 hours additional enemy
contact forced the artillery to engage a series of bunker complexes.
The artillery battalions then moved forward and 4-82 occupied
along the 75 North/South grid line, and 3-20 FA occupied along
the 67 North/South grid line. At 1945 hours, 4-82 FA expended
20 rounds of DPICM and destroyed three trucks. Later at 2049
hours they fired 48 rounds of HE at an enemy mortar position.
Secondary explosions were observed by a FIST. By 2200 hours,
the 2d Brigade had repositioned, and the 4-82 FA and 3-20 FA
both fired at a series of targets commencing at 2220 hours. In
addition the Q-36 radar generated targets which were cleared
and then fired. Enemy indirect fire systems did not continue.
The battle then turned to a direct fire engagement. 4-82 FA fired
seven missions and 276 rounds.
In the 1st Bde zone, 2-3 FA travelled with one battery forward
with 3-5 CAV, the lead element, and two batteries back. The Gunner
battalion emplaced at the following locations at 1630 hours:
A Battery PU 661140, B Battery PU 702142, and C Battery PU 663130.
At 1700 hours, 2-29 FA emplaced with a center of mass at PU 667160.
At 1704 hours A Battery 2-3 FA fired the first round, an illumination
projectile with a 100 meter height of burst. Approximately 15
minutes later the 2-29 FA occupied positions. Both battalions
continued to fire in support. 2-3 FA fired missions at 2020 and
2030 hours against bunkers and dismounted infantry. They used
a combination of DPICM, HE and white phosphorus (WP). High explosive
and white phosphorus shells in combination proved effective against
the bunkers. At about the same time, 2-29 FA massed with 2-3
FA and fired DPICM against the bunker complexes. At 2305 hours,
2 LT Bush (B/3-5 CAV FIST) called for and received a Copperhead
round which was delivered by A Battery, 2-3 FA. The Copperhead
round destroyed an enemy bunker. Later in the evening, the attached
Q-36 radar detected an enemy artillery position firing and three
battalions, the 2-3 FA, 2-29 FA, and 1-27 FA massed fires to
silence the enemy artillery.
Due to uncertainty about the division southern boundary, the
1st Brigade established a boundary "north" of the Division
boundary with 1ID beyond which they did not fire. This was done
because it was believed that friendly troops were to the front
of the Brigade in the Southern part of the sector. However it
was unclear who they were, and the new "boundary" served
to prevent fratricide. However, the Gunners still executed 15
fire missions and fired 615 rounds.
During the brigade engagements, the 1-27 FA engaged deep targets.
A/40 FA fired one mission and expended 12 rockets on a GCT battery
which was detected by the Q-37 radar attached to 4-82 FA.
At 2106 hours the Divarty received new coordinates for the
FSCL which became effective at 1700 hours. The QU and QT 20 North/South
gridline beyond Objective Minden became the new FSCL.
Unit locations late in the evening were as follows: A/40 FA
vicinity grid PU 6525, 2-82 FA grid PU 5225, and 3-20 FA grid
PU 6723.
The Divarty HQ traveled 41 miles on the third day of the war.
The Division fought throughout the evening to gain control
of Phase Line Bullet.
Task Organization, G-Day +2, 26 Feb 91
3d Armored Division Artillery
2-3 FA, DS 1st BDE
2-82 FA, DS 3d BDE
4-82 FA, DS 2d BDE
A/40 FA, GS
F/333 FA, GS
42d Field Artillery Brigade, R 3ADA
2-29 FA, R 2-3 FA
3-20 FA, R 4-82 FA
1-27 FA, GS
Return to Index
G+3, 27 FEBRUARY 1991
The Division continued to battle the enemy. At 0244 hours
A/40 FA reported "shot". At 0305 hours they reported
"rounds complete" on 6 missions for a total of 69 rockets.
The 42d FAB fired 7 targets with 71 rockets at 0312 hours. At
0400 hours a MET was flown to ensure firing accuracy. At 0500
hours, the 1-27 FA fired an additional 5 missions and 44 rockets.
BDA for A/40 FA fires were reported by the DTAC as follows: approximately
13 Ammunition trucks, 2 BMP's, one SA-9, and one jeep.
At 0608 hours, the Divarty received a new FSCL (from grid
QU 5020 to QT 5090) from VII Corps with an effective DTG of 0300
hours.
At 0430 hours the 3d Brigade, 3AD received the mission to
pass through the 2d Brigade the next day. On order organization
for combat was announced that placed 3-20 FA reinforcing 2-82
FA and A/40 FA GSR to 2-82 FA. At 0700 LTC Absher, LTC Davis,
LTC Faircloth and CPT Tokar met to coordinate the fire support
requirements of the passage. Positions for 2-82 FA (along the
65 North/South grid line) were coordinated for occupation in
the 2d Brigade zone in order for 2-82 FA to conduct a prep in
support of the 3d Brigade passage of lines. The battalion occupied
firing positions at 0530 hours.
Meanwhile in the Ist Brigade zone, at 0400 hours 2-3 FA fired
7 HE and 21 DPICM at another bunker system.
At 0457 hours, the Divarty received the following adjacent unit
update from the Division Main: " On the 3AD north, the 1AD
is in contact with the Tawakalna Division. Brigades of 1AD at
the following locations: 1st Bde grid PU 8038, 2d Bde grid PU
8046, 3d Bde grid PU 8031. On the 3AD south, the 1ID is also
in contact with the Tawakalna Division. Brigades of 1ID at the
following locations: 1/4 CAV screening the center at grid PU
7000, 1st Bde grid PT 8090, 2d Bde grid PU 7090, 3d Bde grid
PU 8080.
In order to establish the Force Field Artillery Headquarters
well forward with the majority of artillery delivery systems,
the Divarty S-3 started coordination with the 42d FAB. At approximately
0900 hrs, the Divarty S-3 coordinated with the 42d FAB for the
conduct of Mutual Support Unit (MSU) operations. The Brigade
became the 3AD Force Field Artillery Headquarters while the Divarty
displaced forward. At 0959 the Divarty Headquarters moved to
support Division operations and the 42d FAB assumed control.
At this time, the Division had two brigades on line with 2d
Brigade in the north and 1st Brigade in the south oriented to
the east along Phase Line Bullet. The 4-82 FA planned a preparation
to support the passage of lines. The passage was planned for
early morning, and the prep was eventually fired at 0720 hours.
The battalion fired a 72-round prep on three targets at grids:
PT 733228, PT 728217, and PT 719268. Two tanks and a BMP were
destroyed. There was an additional delay before the passage actually
started about 1000 hours. The 3d Brigade passed through the 2d
Brigade in the north and the Division pressed the attack forward
toward Phase Line Lime and Objective Dorsett. The 3-20 FA executed
its on order mission to reinforce 2-82 FA. A/40 FA assumed its
mission as well - general support reinforcing 2-82 FA. Upon completion
of the passage, 2-82 FA occupied new positions and fired 196
DPICM rounds against dug-in Iraqi infantry and armor positions
at grids PT 870240 and PT E378232. The battalion destroyed 9
T-55 tanks and 2 bunker complexes. The 2d Brigade became the
Division reserve with a "be prepared to follow and support"
mission. Consequently, 4-82 FA maintained its Direct Support
mission to the 2d Brigade.
In the southern zone, 2-3 FA and 2-29 FA initiated the action
by firing at trucks and bunkers in two separate missions. Together
in mass they expended 24 rounds of DPICM, 47 rounds of WP and
45 rounds of High Explosive munitions. At about 1000 hours the
Ist Brigade, its Direct Support Artillery, 2-3 FA and 2-29 FA
reinforcing, moved forward to continue the attack.
On or about the time of the passage, the Division Commander
authorized the Combat Aviation Brigade to send attack helicopters
after targets in Objective Dorsett. Since the objective was well
in range of surface fire support assets (MLRS rockets, and FA
cannon), the Fire Support Element established a line (the 85
North/South grid line) beyond which any fires had to be coordinated
with the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Fire Support Officer.
In effect, this established a maneuver zone for the CAB.
Throughout the day, the Divarty TOC moved in the southern
zone behind the 1st Brigade. At 1400 the Ist Bde made contact
with the enemy. By 1454 hours, B Battery 2-3 FA was engaging
tanks with DPICM. The Divarty HQ conducted a hasty occupation
at approximately 1500 hrs (grid PU 82Ol7O) and provided control
of supporting fires. The occupation site was in close proximity
to 2-3 FA and the 2-29 FA, and the members of the Divarty TOC
could observe the firing several hundred meters ahead.
The 42d FAB was ordered forward and they subsequently closed
at about 1800 hours. The 1st and 3d Brigades continued the attack
through Objective Dorsett. Then, throughout the evening the 1st
and 3d Brigades continued movement southeast through Objective
Minden. The 3d Brigade entered Kuwait at 1643 hours and arrived
at PL Kiwi at 1930 hours. The 2-3 FA timing with 1st Brigade
was slightly slower. 2-3 FA crossed PL Lime at 1700 hours, and
crossed into Kuwait at 2200 hours. The Gunners occupied the following
positions: TOC QT 117982, A Battery QT 1249B2, B Battery QT 148974,
C Battery QT 124977. The 2/29 FA occupied at center of mass QT
120990. Concurrently, both the 1AD arid 1ID secured PL Kiwi on
the Division northern and southern flanks.
The Gunners fired 42 fire mission, and 827 rounds, 682 of
which were Dual Purpose ICM. The Dragons fired 9 missions and
expended 76 rounds. The Red Dragons fired 5 missions and dumped
221 rounds of DPICM on T-72 Tanks, BMP's, and dismounted infantry.
A/40 FA fired 9 missions and 81 rockets against light armor,
an assembly area, and artillery positions.
At approximately 1730 hours, 8 enemy soldiers surrendered
to the HHB. They remained in the position overnight and were
taken away by the Military Police the following day after HHB
departed. The Divarty traveled 14 miles on the fourth day of
the war.
Task Organization, G-Day +3, 27 Feb 91
3d Armored Division Artillery
2-3 FA, DS 1st BDE
2-82 FA, DS 3d BDE
4-82 FA, DS 2d BDE
A/40 FA, GS o/o GSR 2-82
F/333 FA, GS
42d Field Artillery Brigade, R 3D Divarty
2-29 FA, R 2-3 FA
3-20 FA, R 4-82 FA o/o R 2-82 FA
1-27 FA, GS
Return to Index
G+4, 28 FEBRUARY 1991
At 0200, the Division issued FRAGO 84 announcing that a temporary
cease fire was in effect at DTG 280800 hours. The Allied Coalition
Forces agreed to a tentative cease fire with the enemy. The mission
of 3AD was to transition from offensive operations to force protection
operations in zone and prepare to defend Northern Kuwait. The
2d Brigade clears the 3AD zone from PL Tangerine to PL Success
which was the 1st and 3d Brigade rear boundaries. The 1st and
3d Brigades clear the zone between PL Success and PL Kiwi. MOPP
Level 0 became effective 0800 hours. Wartime rules of engagement
were still in effect.
At approximately 1000 hours, the Divarty started movement
to a Division assembly area in accordance with guidance provided
by Annex C (Operations Overlay) to 3AD FRAGO's 83 and 84. PL
Lime became the Division rear boundary. The Divarty moved 19
miles deeper into Kuwait and occupied at grid QU 095142 at 1300
hours. The terrain through Objective Dorsett, across the Iraq
and Kuwait border, and into Kuwait itself, was littered with
destroyed or abandoned enemy vehicles as well as numerous bunkers
and defensive fighting positions.
The 42d FAB units fired the following numbers of missions
and ammunition: 3-20 FA fired 27 missions and 1121 rounds. 2-29
FA fired 50 missions and 1733 rounds. The 1-27 fired 44 missions
and expended 555 MLRS rockets.
Task Organization, G-Day +4, 28 Feb 91
3d Armored Division Artillery
2-3 FA, DS 1st BDE
2-82 FA, DS 3d BDE
4-82 FA, DS 2d BDE
A/40 FA, GSR 4-82 FA
F/333 FA, GS
42d Field Artillery Brigade, R 3D Divarty
2-29 FA, GS
3-20 FA, GS
1-27 FA, GS
[END of Summary]
|